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Over the last decade, consolidation within the EU-financial services industry has been 
enhanced by deregulation, the EMU, new technologies with increased sunk costs, 
increased price competition and decreased product differentiation, see Heremans and Van 
Cayseele (1996), Heremans and Van Cayseele (1998), Gual (1999), Berger et. al. (1999) 
and Van Cayseele and Degryse (2000). The resulting outcome is often a very concentrated 
banking market, see ECB (2000) or Group of Ten (2001). 
 
In such a concentrated banking market, concerns for the existence of market power vis-à-
vis borrowers and depositors are justified. Also, the changes in liquidity management and 
funding induced by this consolidation wave evidently raise concerns regarding financial 
stability. More in particular when merged banks should decide to lower their precautions 
against liquidity shocks in view of a liquidity pool being created within the group, both 
individual banks and the system as a whole could become less stable. 
 
If bank mergers invariantly increased market power and reduced precautionary actions 
taken within the banking system, the policy conclusions would be straight forward. Both 
the antitrust authority and the regulator in charge of prudential control would oppose 
consolidation. Unfortunately for policy making, bank mergers in reality also can reduce 
loan rates because of efficiency gains. Or the merged entity could have more firewalls 
against liquidity shocks. Therefore, it could well be that some interesting but difficult 
trade-offs between competition policy and prudential regulation occur. 
 
Carletti and Hartmann (2002a) surveyed the competition stability nexus in banking and 
indicate that the widely accepted trade-off between competition and stability does not hold 
in general. They also show that in order to reach appropriate conclusions, one needs 
models that are able to address the effect of bank mergers on competition and liquidity 
directly. 
 
In order to analyse the market power and liquidity implications of bank mergers directly, 
Carletti, Hartmann and Spagnolo (2002b), henceforth (CHS), extended the Deneckere-
Davidson model, see Deneckere and Davidson (1985). This approach has many advantages 
and discloses interesting insights regarding the consequences of bank mergers. For a more 
detailed discussion, see section 2 below. Regarding the approach, the supermodularity of 
the loan rate competition game ensures the desire to engage in merger activity. An   2 
additional advantage to the merging parties comes from gains on operating costs. Hence 
the model used incorporates some of the incentives to merge that are around in reality. 
 
Any particular merger however will not incorporate all of the above incentives to the same 
extent. In practice, a distinction is often made between cost efficient versus revenue 
exchanging mergers, see HSBC James Capel (1997) for example. In line with the academic 
literature (for a survey, see Hunter and Wall (1989)), the present paper distinguishes 
between mergers that: 
a. increase market power; 
b. improve liquidity management by enhancing the revenue basis; 
c. improve on operational cost efficiencies. 
 
To illustrate the potential importance of the distinction between a and b type mergers, 
consider an economy with two manufacturing sectors, e.g. textiles and machinery, and four 
banks denoted by A, B, C and D. Due to specialisation in banking, a firm in the textile 
industry can borrow from bank A or B, while a firm in the manufacturing of machinery can 
apply for a loan at bank C or D. Clearly, when A  and B merge, these banks can 
monopolize lending to the textile industry and exploit their market power to squeeze rent 
out of firms. But at the same time, when a particular firm in the textile industry needs 
credit and liquidity, probably other textile manufacturers will ask for the same. So 
increased market power comes at the cost of a worsening of the liquidity demand exposure. 
 
In contrast, when A decides to merge with D, no market power results as a textile 
manufacturer can turn to B and a manufacturer of machinery to C instead of asking a loan 
from the merged group. If in addition liquidity demand in textiles and machinery is 
uncorrelated or negatively correlated, a merger between A and D will improve the liquidity 
position and funding of the group. 
 
The maintained assumption in the present paper therefore is that sources of market power 
are equally sources of increased liquidity risk. Or the proximity in tastes (or sectoral 
specialization of the financial services industry) accounts for the elimination of substitutes 
in case of a merger between “adjacent” banks (which therefore is a cause of market power) 
but entails at the same time a positive correlation of liquidity demands. 
 
In a subordinate way, we investigate mergers that create operational efficiencies, that is the 
mergers of type c above. We therefore consider a few types of bank mergers. The first type 
is motivated by an increase in market power over borrowers in a particular area or sector of   3 
the economy. Such a merger allows the exploitation of market power but doesn’t shelter 
the merged bank from the impact of a shock. A sub case of this type of merger incorporates 
operational cost savings that are typically documented for banks operating on the same 
revenue basis. 
 
The second type has precisely the opposite characteristics: it combines borrowing to firms 
in entirely different activities, allowing the latter to turn to other banks, but improves upon 
the liquidity management possibilities of the group. As such, an interesting side product of 
the present paper is that not only the advantages to the merging banks of increased market 
power are determined endogenously, but also the cost efficiencies realised by a particular 
type of merger. Or in contrast to merger scenario’s that arise from an exogenously 
determined decrease in operating cost, we incorporate cost savings resulting from a better 
pooling of reserves within a group. Since this merger type involves spreading activities 
over more regions or sectors, it would be classified in the management literature as a 
revenue enchanging merger. These mergers do not allow most of the time for operational 
cost savings, so a sub case incorporating these is not of much interest. 
 
In order to explore the implications of correlated preferences for particular bank locations 
by borrowing firms asking for liquidity, we introduce a simple model of localized loan 
competition with liquidity shocks originating in the real part of the economy, see section 3 
below. It turns out that some of the various types of mergers induce particular trade-offs 
between competition and stability, whereas others don’t. By looking at the type of 
environment that is conducive to a particular type of merger, one could argue in favour of 
one of the very many organisations  of the r eview  process for  bank mergers that are 
observed for the G-7 industrialised countries, as documented in Carletti and Hartmann 
(2002a). We will indicate which environments “rationalize” some of the particular 
organisations of merger review observed in reality. 
 
The fourth section indicates how the maintained assumption put forward in the present 
paper can be extended to obtain other interesting models of banking competition and 
liquidity demand. An attempt to endogenize some elements of the interbank market is 
made, there by trying to shed light on the relative position of competition policy and 
prudential regulation. A final section concludes, see section 5. Before all of this, we 
provide a brief and directional survey of the relevant literature. This in order to indicate the 
importance of accounting for links between sources of market power and liquidity risk and 
to point out the similarities and differences between the present contribution and others. 
   4 
2. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
There is a substantial literature on competition and mergers in banking, and a massive 
literature on the economics of competition in general. We however only discuss the 
contributions which are important to justify the present paper in subsection 2a below. 
There is an equally important and rapidly growing literature on financial crises, contagion, 
fragility, ….. . Also here only the elements of importance to this paper are represented, see 
subsection 2b below. Finally, regarding the combination of competition policy and 
prudential regulation issues, the contribution by CHS is seminal. Subsection 2c takes a 
closer look at that model. 
 
 
2.a. Mergers, banking competition and antitrust issues 
 
Over the last decade, few if any models of demand systems with equal cross price-
elasticities of demand have been used for policy purposes. In such models, a price increase 
of a product or set of products due to a merger increases the sales of every other brand in 
the relevant market by the same percentage. In order to avoid such an unrealistic outcome, 
either the cross elasticities are estimated (as in the antitrust logit model, see Werden and 
Froeb (1994)), or a theoretical model of discrete consumer choice is written down and used 
for merger simulation purposes after calibration, see Werden and Froeb (2002) 
 
It seems therefore appropriate to focus on mergers in banking markets where competition 
is localized, this in line with a long tradition of these models in the banking literature, see 
e.g. Matutes and Padilla (1994), Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1995), Bouckaert 
and Degryse (1995) and Schargrodsky and Sturzenegger (2000). Recently, also empirical 
research more and more indicates the importance of distance in banking competition, see 
Degryse and Ongena (2003).  The basic “Salop” type of specification of tastes used in the 
above references, see Salop (1979), therefore also will be the point of departure in the next 
section. 
 
A final but important development comes out of the literature on competition policy and 
merger approval. It concerns the information that can be derived from parties proposing a 
particular merger in a world where many such operations are conceivable. The idea is that 
the proposed merger will be the one that yields the highest increase in profits to the 
merging parties. In some cases, this will be the most harmful to consumers, hence   5 
‘tougher” approval standards might be warranted, see Lyons (2002). In the present context, 
when different merger “types” are conceivable, i.e. mergers that increase market power 
and others that decrease the costs of liquidity management, it is worthwhile investigating 
the parameter values for which an efficiency-enhancing versus a loan rate increasing 
merger will be proposed. And taking the argument even one step further, one could argue 
that in the presence of a Central Bank that can influence particular parameters, the mergers 
that will be proposed should be investigated especially from an antitrust perspective. For 
the prudential regulator could always influence the market by particular interest r ate 
instruments that it controls, stimulating particular merger types instead of others. We will 
investigate this line of argumentation in section 4 since it is a first step in modelling the 
interbanking market more completely. 
 
 
2.b. Banks as liquidity providers and prudential regulation 
 
The existence of banks as providers of liquidity is central to modern banking theory. In 
their seminal papers, Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed how banks 
can facilitate long term investment by providing  demandable deposits to otherwise 
(possibly) impatient agents. They equally show how a particular equilibrium of the game 
involves a bank run, where both patient and inpatient depositors withdraw their holdings. 
More recently, some articles (e.g. Diamond and Rajan (2001) and Kashyap, Rajan and 
Stein (2002) have indicated that banks also provide liquidity to borrowers. If the liquidity 
demands on both sides of the balance are to some extent negatively correlated, important 
synergies can be exploited from a single buffer stock of liquid assets. These synergies 
allow banks to provide liquidity cheaper than any other “single product” operator in the 
market, and hence economies of scope existing in the production of liquidity constitute an 
additional explanation for the emergence of banks. 
 
Along the same likes, Saidenberg and Strahan (1999) have recently documented interesting 
facts that both provide evidence in favour of the novel theory of banking by Kashyap, 
Rajan and Stein, and that allow for a re-interpretation of the present model. More in 
particular, Saidenberg and Strahan show that in periods of turmoil, rising interest rates 
reflect the increased uncertainty in the market. They further show, documented by 
empirical observations, that this well may lead to increased bank borrowing going hand in 
hand with more depositors turning to banks for providing a safe haven to their funds. The 
reason for firms to borrow more against their credit lines with banks follows from the 
higher interest rates paid on their securities placed in the open market in periods of turmoil.   6 
If turmoil in one region then is independent or negatively corrected with the stability of 
another region or industry, an environment which closely resembles the one modelled 
below is in place. 
 
There however exists an even simpler scenario for explaining the liquidity needs 
considered in the present paper. Suppose firms who experience a boom need cash 
instantaneously. This because they know inventories will not suffice to supply all that is 
demanded, while additional investments in equipment, storage facilities, a.s.o. also need to 
be made. Suppose firms foresee that a boom will realize, because the country in which they 
operate will organise the European Championship of a certain sport activity. It is however 
not known yet whether the infrastructure of one region or the other will be used. 
(Alternatively, firms know the country is which they operate has experienced an important 
growth in income, yet it is unclear whether the money will be spent on foreign travel 
(when the domestic weather conditions are bad) or cocooning (when the summer in the 
country turns out to be a success)). 
 
Firms in order to meet demand will invariantly turn to their banks to open credit lines. 
Banks who compete with each other offer rates that need to the paid when credit is taken 
up. The boom then either realizes in one region (sector) or the other, and loan activity 
increases there. 
 
In order to fund the loans when they realize, banks will secure core deposits to meet part of 
the loan demand, before hand. Once the loans realize, additional funding will be obtained 
either from a Lender of Last Resort or through the interbank market. This scenario is the 
one described in the managerial economic literature on banking, see for example Koch 
(1995) who explains that liquidity problems occur because of net deposit outflows which 
are mostly predictable. But: 
 
“Still, some outflows are totally unexpected. Management often does not know 
whether customers will reinvest maturing CDs and keep the funds with the 
bank, or with draw them.  Management also cannot predict when loan 
customers will borrow against open credit lines. This uncertainly increases 
the risk that a bank may not have adequate sources of funds available to meet 
payment requirements”. 
 
Both elements mentioned are key to the model that will be presented below, since it 
includes the bank paying for core deposits to assure that a minimum of liquidity can be met 
by the bank when loans realize, whereas the liquidity deficits arise from firms borrowing 
against open credit lines.   7 
Also Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) indicate how the notion of liquidity is strongly related 
to commitments taken by the bank. They explain that: 
 
“It may, for instance, be the case that many borrowers make simultaneous 
use of their credit lines with the bank. It may also happen that a number of 
long-time borrowers request new loans and that the bank feels obligated to 
grant them for fear of letting the competition in.” 
 
Finally, Allen and Gale (2000) have investigated the possibility for banks to insure against 
liquidity risks by holding interregional claims on other banks. This of course opens the 
door to financial contagion, a situation where a run at some bank triggers runs at other 
banks too. Such spillovers  might be confined to the boundaries of a nation, but due to 
further globalisation and cross-border mergers, the contagion risk more and more becomes 
an international threat, see Heremans (2002) or Degryse and Nguyen (2003). The present 
paper investigates the “disconnected incomplete market structure” introduced by Allen and 
Gale, o.c., page 15. It considers interregional mergers as a substitute for interbank market 




2.c. Bank mergers, competition and liquidity 
 
As mentioned before, CHS (2002b) investigate the consequences of bank mergers on 
competition and liquidity management, hence combining some of the concerns addressed 
in subsections 2.a. and 2.b. above. They start from a game with Bertrand competition in 
loan rates, and with product differentiation regarding the loan contracts offered by banks. 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) showed that for this particular model, incentives to merge 
out of market power reasons exist. Van Cayseele (2002) moreover shows that in this 
model, post merger entry is neither likely to discipline the merger so as to eliminate the 
advantages in terms of profit increases to the merging parties, nor to make up for the losses 
to consumers. The model presented in section 3 below departs from the same idea of 
investigating loan rate competition between banks in a model of Bertrand competition with 
product differentiation. 
 
But as argued already, tastes are local rather than global, or preferences are “Kaldorean” 
rather than “Chamberlinean”. Another difference mentioned already is that liquidity shocks 
are not confined to the depositors of a bank (each bank facing a liquidity shock stochastic 
in size), but instead they affect all borrowers in a particular region (or industry) of the   8 
economy. While CHS consider no correlation or negative correlation between the post 
merger liquidity risks, here the shock either perfectly correlates in a positive or a negative 
way, according to the particular merger operation chosen. 
 
A final difference with CHS concerns the balance sheet of the competing banks. In CHS, 
the focus is on the size of reserves held in liquid assets which don’t pay any rent. This as 
opposed to loans for which banks have determined a loan rate in the presence of 
competitors who also did this. Both reserves and loans then are matched by attracting 
deposits which are paid a deposit rate. The fraction of impatient depositors withdraw their 
holdings, and if this volume is in excess of the liquid assets the banks hold in terms of 
reserves, the bank refinances itself in the interbanking market. 
 
In the present model, the focus is on the management of the liabilities side of the balance 
sheet whereas the liquidity needs come from the asset side of the balance. On the asset 
side, by determining the loan rate in the presence of competitors, the volume of credit lines 
is fixed. 
 
When firms start borrowing against these liquidity commitments made by banks, first the 
core deposits that have been secured by paying an interest rate will be exhausted. 
Afterwards, the bank will seek additional funding with the Lender Of Last Resort (LOLR). 
 
Whenever the firms in the region (sector) in which the bank is active do not need cash, 
they will not borrow against the open credit lines. In which case the bank will transfer the 
core deposits it has attracted in the form of interest bearing time deposits to the LOLR, in 
terms of liquidity held in reserves. 
 
It is assumed that there is but a single LOLR who therefore can exert monopoly power to 
banks who seek additional funding, as well as monopsony power vis-a-vis banks who have 
accumulated liquidity for which they have no use. The balance sheet for bank i in region 
(sector) s then will depend on the state of the economy that realizes there.  In figure 1, the 
possible outcomes are represented. Besides indicating where liquidity needs come from, 
this figure is helpful in getting acquainted with the notation used in the next section. 
 
 
   9 
Figure 1: Balance sheets of bank i in region s 
 
a) Economy is depressed in region s 
 















b) Economy booms it region s 
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In the present model, the cost of obtaining additional funding depends on the volume of 
funds needed in a positive way. This could reflect the pricing policy of the LOLR, see 
section 4. In an alternative interpretation it could be a correction on the value of the loan 
portfolio of which some loans need to be sold off at important discounts in order to obtain 
the necessary funding. 
 
Both in CHS and the present model, the rates paid for attracting deposits are given 
exogenously. Both CHS and the present model investigate the implications of mergers on 
two dimensions. First there is the aspect of market power. Both papers focus on the so-
called “unilateral effects”, that is the non-cooperative equilibria of the one shot games are 
compared before and after merger. The increased market power is reflected in higher price 
cost margins or spreads between loan and deposit rates. (The policy analysis in the present 
paper also introduces the SSNIP-test in merger review, which nowadays is used often in 
the appraisal of mergers by several competition authorities. A more detailed discussion of 
the SSNIP-concept is provided below). 
 
Second, the impact of the merger on liquidity is investigated in CHS by computing the 
probability that aggregate demand for liquidity exceeds aggregate reserves. The average 
size of the shortage is computed both in CHS and the present model as an indicator for the 
post-merger stability of the system as compared to the status quo without merger. The 
following table summarizes the similarities and differences of both models, while figure 2 
highlights the most important differences in terms of how the assumptions made link up to 
the existing literature on banking competition and liquidity management.   11 
Table 1: Similarities and Differences between the CHS model and the Present 
 
  CHS  Present model 
Loan Rates  Banks compete globally for 
loans 
Banks compete locally for 
credit lines 
Deposit Rates  Given exogenously  Given exogenously 
Operational Costs  CRS, given exogenously. Can 
decrease as result of merger 
CRS, given exogenously. Can 
decrease as result of merger 
Additional Funding  Refunding on interbank market 
at exogenous rates 
Additional funding with LOLR 
at exogenous rates, except in 
section 4 
Liquidity Needs: Causes  Withdrawal of deposits. 
Idiosyncratic at bank level 
Borrowing against credit lines. 
Idiosyncratic at regional level 
Correlation of Needs  Independent or negative  Positive or negative depending 
on location 
Stability Target  Average Liquidity Shortage on 
Interbank market 
Average Liquidity Shortage 
that the LOLR has to put up 
Competition Policy Target  Post Merger Loan Rates  Post Merger Loan Rates, 
formalised in SSNIP 
CRS: Constant Returns to Scale   12 
Figure 2: Position in the Literature of the Different Models 
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The comparison in table 1 above indicates how both models are alike is many respects. 
There are however some differences too, and these will explain for different outcomes. An 
opportunity made available by the particular way of modelling here is the possibility to 
endogenously determine the size of a cost advantage associated with a particular merger. 
Whereas CHS distinguish between an operating cost (which decreases after merger hence 
capturing some scale effect) and “flat rate borrowing” on the interbanking market, we 
focus on LOLR lending at increasing rates in the volume of funds needed. This implies that 
mergers that enhance liquidity management possibilities entail endogenous cost savings. 
These are not present in merger operations that bring together banks operating in the same 
region or sector. The latter on the other hand have the advantage to increase market power 
and to potentially reduce operating costs. This introduces the trade-off in merger 
motivation that allows for the endogenization of the merger type that will come about . 
 
In terms of the criteria used for merger evaluation, a decrease resp. an increase in the loan 
rate is an indication of reduced resp. increased market power. Regarding the liquidity 
demand on the system, the yardstick to compare pre-merger with post-merger outcomes is 
defined as the Expected Liquidity Shortage (ELS). This is the expected volume of funds 
that the Central Bank as a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) has to create on top of the liquid 
reserves it has from the banks in the depressed region, in order to meet the liquidity needs 
of the banks in the booming region. A formal definition is given in the next section.   13 
3. A SIMPLE MODEL OF SPATIAL COMPETITION IN A BANKING MARKET 
WITH LIQUIDITY SHOCKS 
 
 
While the model presented and analysed in this section is simple, it has the advantage that 
it can cope with the research questions that have been raised in the previous section. As 
such it allows for the analysis of the implications of particular mergers in which some of 
them are driven by market power motives while others try to increase efficiency in 
liquidity risk management. It further allows to investigate which merger type is preferred, 
given the environment. 
 
In the next subsection, the assumptions underlying the model are specified and the criteria 
used for policy analysis are explained. Then the model is analysed and the results are stated 
in the format of propositions. Finally, an indication of which particular organisation of the 
merger review process is likely to clear particular types of mergers is provided, as a 
conclusion to our analysis. 
 
 
3.a. The model: assumptions 
 
We consider an economy with 6 banks. (This easily can be extended to an economy with N 
banks). The economy consists of 2 distinct regions (or industries). Regions induce a gap in 
the chain of substitution in that firms (borrowers) located in one region of the economy 
will never consider obtaining a loan from a bank located in another region of the economy. 
This might reflect a pronounced specialization in monitoring loans, as suggested by the 
delegated monitoring theory of the nature of the bank, see Diamond (1984). 
 
Within each region, firms a priori could consider opening a credit line with each of the 3 
banks. (We assume banks split equally between regions which has the advantage that 
regions are symmetric while competition within each region still is “global”). Credit lines 
carry fixed limits against which firms can borrow, provided they pay the loan rate agreed 
upon. We normalize their size, setting them equal to 1. But since firms are uniformly 
distributed along a circle of length 3, and banks are equidistantly spread along the circle, in 
practice each and every firm will consider at most 2 banks to borrow from. 
 
To save on notation, especially in later sections, we assume that in the Northern region, 
one bank is located at 0 degrees, and called the “North” bank. The “North” bank is in every   14 
respect exactly the same as any other bank in this region. The other banks in the Northern 
region are located at resp. 120 and 240 degrees and called the South East and South West 
bank. In the Southern Region of the economy, the constituting bank in terminological 
aspect is the “South” bank, located at 180 degrees. The banks in this region are located at 
resp. 60 and 300 degrees, and called the North East and North West bank. See also 
figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Market Structure 
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Any firm located at x, i.e. between two banks, say the one located at 0 degrees and the one 
located at 120 degrees, derives indirect utility  ( ) tx r v N + -  when borrowing form the bank 
located at 0 degrees (the “North” bank) while it obtains  ( ) ( ) x t r v SE - + - 1  when borrowing 
from the bank located at 120 degrees (the “South East” bank). 
 
In the above formula’s,  t stands for a travelling cost firms incur per unit of distance 
travelled, and  N r  and  SE r  for resp. the interest rate charged by the North and South East 
bank. The reservation value v is assumed sufficiently high so as to keep the market covered 
at all times. The firm located at x will be indifferent between contracting with the North 
and South East bank when: 
  ( ) x t r tx r SE N - + = + 1   (1) 
This implies bank N will have a market share of  





•  • x 
x   15 
Banks are affected by regional liquidity shocks. Whenever a liquidity shock hits a region, 
all open credit lines are used to borrow against. So if a shock hits the Northern region, 
banks N, SE and SW are confronted with all firms asking for liquidity. A shock either hits 
the Northern or the Southern region. This implies a perfect and positive correlation of 
liquidity shocks for banks N, SE and SW, and a perfectly negative correlation for liquidity 
shocks of the forementioned banks and banks S, NE and NW. To start, we assume that a 
shock comes up for sure, hence all banks are effected by liquidity demands up to the entire 





Against these shocks, banks can insure by attracting term deposits T at rent r ~ . In case of a 
liquidity shock, loans realize against open credit lines and banks will turn to the LOLR to 
obtain liquidity in excess of what they already have as the result of having attracted time 
deposits. We assume that the rate paid is an increasing function of the amount of liquidity 
needed, or r ’ > 0. When a volume of liquidity equal to y is borrowed from the LOLR, the 
total cost of this operation is then given by: 
  ( )y y r   (3) 
where r  is an increasing function of y. In particular, we assume  ( ) y r y r = . 
 
On the other side of its balance sheet, the LOLR can exploit its monopsony power to 
attract the term deposits that have been collected by the banks in the region where liquidity 
is not needed at 0 cost. Or banks which secure term deposits before loans realize, have no 
alternative use for the liquidity built up, than to leave it as no interest bearing reserves with 
the Central Bank. 
 





                                                 
1
  If q differs from ½, an asymmetry between regions is introduced. Including a probability of a shock p˛ 
(0,1) in order to incorporate the possibility that shocks are less frequent, doesn’t change the results.   16 
Figure 4: Time Line of Decisions 
 
1:  Banks announce loan rates and secure term deposits. 
2:  Firms decide on identity of bank to open credit line. 
3:  State of the economy realizes. 
4:  Firms in the booming region lend against open credit lines. 
5:  Banks in booming region seek additional funding with LOLR while banks in the 
depressed region transfer funds to the LOLR. 
 
Given all these assumptions, the profit functions to bank  { } SW SE N i , , ˛  is given by: 
    (4) 




Whereas for k ˛{S, NE, NW}, expected profits are: 




































c r 1 1 1 ~ 1 1 q q   (5) 
Where k?l
3
 and c is a constant per unit cost for processing loans. 
 
Regarding the criteria used for policy making, the stability criterion used is the Expected 
Shortage of Liquidity (ELS). This is equal to the amount borrowed against credit lines 
which is not covered by the term deposits with the banks in the region which is hit by the 
liquidity shock minus the liquidity that can be transferred from the region which is not hit 
by the shock. Formally: 
 
                                                 
2
   In fact, j = SE = SW when i = N, while j = N =SW when i = SE, a.s.o. 
3
   In line with footnote 2,we have that l = NE, NW when k = S, a.s.o. 
1  2  3  4  5 
time 
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( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] S N S N N S S S N N T T L L T T L T T L ELS - - - + = - - - + - - = q q q q 1 3 3 3 ) 1 ( 3 3   (6) 
where the subscripts N and S have been used to denote the equilibrium amount of credit 
given by a bank in the North and the South, as well as the equilibrium levels of terms 
deposits held, respectively. Given that within each region, banks are symmetric, (6) further 
reduces to: [ ] S N T T ELS - - = 1 3 . When  2 1 = q , regions and hence banks are symmetric in 
every respect and  T T L ELS 6 3 6 3 - = - = . 
 
In terms of competition policy, post merger loan rates are compared to the pre-merger 
levels. As an alternative, one could look at spreads (loan-deposit rate) or margins (loan 
rate-operational cost). The advantage of comparing price levels is that the link with the so-
called SSNIP test is immediate. SSNIP denotes a “Small but Significant and Non-
transitory Increase in Price”  above the prevailing level. It was introduced by the US 
Department of Justice in 1984 in the context of the horizontal merger guidelines, see U.S. 
DOJ (1984). 
 
The underlying idea is that a market structure that is to come about after a merger is 
compared with a hypothetical market structure. The latter includes the group of products 
such that a hypothetical profit maximising firm, if it had control over these products, would 
increase prices by a certain percentage. Although purely arbitrary, the usual critical level of 
this price increase is fixed at 5 per cent. If it turns out that the set of products or services in 
the merger coincides or exceeds the set defined by the hypothetical group, the operation 
should be forbidden, for most likely it will raise prices by more than 5 per cent. 
 
In the present context therefore, if we denote by  M r  the loan rate charged by the merged 
bank, and compare it to the rate charged before under the Status Quo or SQ, the SSNIP5-
test is violated whenever: 
  ( ) SQ SQ M r r r 5 100 > -   (7) 
 
 
3.b. The model: analysis and results 
 
In this subsection, we first characterise the Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies for the loan 
rate competition game before any merger takes place. As in CHS, this outcome is denoted 
by the “Status Quo”. Initially, shocks are a-symmetric. But it turns out below that with 
symmetry of the liquidity shocks, making regions the same in every respect, the best   18 
outcome in terms of loan rates and liquidity shortages prevails. Hence a symmetric 
environment seems a natural point of departure. In section 4, asymmetric extensions are 
discussed in more detail. 
 
Next, mergers are considered. In the present model, many different “types” of mergers can 
occur. One type comes about when a bank merges with another bank located in the same 
region. Since there are only 3 banks present in each region, such a merger involves the 
going together of 2 “adjacent” banks. Rather than using the adjective “adjacent”, which 
indicates that the operation takes place between two nearby competitors, we will denote 
this merger type by the adjective “intraregional”. This has the advantage that it points to 
the fact that such a merger will be hit by a liquidity shock on the combined volume of its 
deposits. 
 
As opposed to an intraregional merger, one has “interregional” (or in an extended context, 
again see section 4, “cross-border”) mergers. Here, the operation does not bring under 
control a rival in the sense of a bank competing for the same pool of firms. The operation 
instead combines two “remote” banks, both in the sense of being distant as an alternative 
for the firms and not being affected by the same liquidity shock. 
 
In addition to the two “main” merger types, i.e. the intraregional or “within” and the 
interregional or  “between” merger, two other merger types are analysed. One is the 
“within” merger which triggers operational cost efficiencies, the other is a “giga” merger 
which involves more than 2 banks. 
 
After having analysed the outcome of all these merger operations, we ask whether they 
would be cleared by merger review. The answer to this question depends on the particular 
setup of the merger review process, and hence a correspondence between the different 
roles played by the different regulators and the mergers that will realise is given. 
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3.b.1. The Status Quo (SQ) 
Given equation (4), it is easy to show the following: 
 
Proposition 3.1:  Before any merger activity, each bank in the Northern Region charges in 
equilibrium a loan rate  q / ~ r c t r
SQ







1- = . In the Southern Region, the equilibrium loan rate and 
deposits respectively are  ( ) q - + + = 1 / ~ r c t r
SQ













































Proof:  By differentiating equation (4) w.r.t.  i r  and  i T , one obtains the two first 
order conditions (F.O.C.’s) for bank i. By substituting the expression 
obtained for  i T  by solving the second F.O.C. into the first F.O.C., one 
obtains that  ( ) ( ) 0 ~ = + - - + - r c r t r r i i q q q . Invoking symmetry, it is 
easy to show that  SQ r  is equal to the expression given in proposition 3.1. 
In order to obtain the equilibrium level of the core (term) deposits 
attracted, the second F.O.C. can be rewritten as the derivative of the 
product of the pricing function and the volume needed to fill liquidity y. 
By  solving, the expression for 
SQ
N T  follows. A similar argument is 
followed to obtain the expressions for the equilibrium loan rate and term 
deposits with the banks in the Southern Region. The expression for ELS 
follows from substituting the expressions for 
SQ
N T  and 
SQ
S T  in (7). 
 
Corollary 3.1.1.  The average loan rate paid by borrowing firms, since both regions are 







+ + + =
q q 1 2
1
2
1 ~ r c t P . It then is easy to 
show that both  P  and ELS attain a minimum when  2 1 = q , since the 
first order derivative w.r.t. q of both  P  and ELS vanish  2 1 = q at while 
the second order derivative is positive. Therefore, full symmetry induces 
the best outcome both for stability and allocative efficiency. From now 
on, we will focus on the fully symmetric case.   20 
Corollary 3.1.2.  When  2 1 = q , the equilibrium values for the Status Quo become: 
  r c t r













SQ   (10) 














  (11) 
These are the benchmark values against which the different mergers will be compared. 
 
Corollary 3.1.3.  The different parameters in the model have different implications on each 
of the targets. As such, increases in t always reduce consumer surplus 
due to higher loan rates, increases in  r  always reduce ELS. But t does 
not affect ELS and  r  does not influence consumer surplus. The term 
deposit rate  r ~  on the other hand interferes always with both consumer 
surplus and ELS. By this we mean that an increase in  r ~  reduces both 
consumer surplus and increases ELS in the status quo situation, after a 
“between” merger, as well as after a “within” merger. So regarding the 
substitutability of loan offers between banks, banking relationships, and 
other factors that influence t, it seems appropriate to have the antitrust 
authority as the relevant policy maker. Interbank market competition, as 
well as lender of last resort relationships which affect r  are by the same 
argument better monitored by the prudential regulator. This is quite 
evident as the “natural” supervisors for the parameters typically are the 
ones mentioned. But both authorities have a keen interest in monitoring 
competition in term deposit rates, since fiercer competition, perhaps 
leading to higher rates will worsen both the loan rate and ELS. 
 
Hence, the organisation of policy making in this Status Quo environment is fairly simple. 
Since certain parameters of the environment affect the competition policy target, others 
affect the stability target and still others affect both targets but in the same direction, there   21 
can be few if any conflicts of interest between the regulators. This conclusion however 
changes as mergers come into the picture, as will become clear immediately. 
 
3.b.2. Intraregional mergers or mergers “Within” 
When say N and SE merge, they will charge  M r  at each location. This b rings about a 
duopoly where the merged entity M operates the N and SE branch, competing with a single 


































c r   (12) 
and 
 
i SW OUTSIDER P = P = P  as given by equation (4), after substituting M r  for  j r . 
 
It then is possible to show: 
 
Proposition 3.2.  After an intraregional merger, the merged entity charges a loan rate equal 
to 
3
~ 6 3 5 r c t
rM
+ +







- = . The 
bank remaining outside the merger charges 
3
~ 6 3 4 r c t
ro
+ +
=  and holds 





- . Banks in the Southern Region charge rates 
and hold term deposits given by corollary 3.1.2. Equilibrium profits to 
















Proof:  By differentiating equation (4) (appropriately changing subscripts to 
denote that the bank  remaining outside the merger  is involved) and 
equation (12) w.r.t. both the loan rates and the term deposits, one obtains 
4 F.O.C.’s. By substituting for  M T  from the second F.O.C. of the merged 
party into the first F.O.C. of the same entity, one obtains an expression 
for  M r in which only  O r  is present. Similarly, substituting for  O T  in the 
first F.O.C. for the outside party, by replacing the equilibrium value, 
yields an expression for  O r  in which only  M r   prevails. Solving the   22 
system of reaction functions  ( ) ( ) [ ] O M M O r r r r ,  for a Nash Equilibrium in 
loan rates yields the results stated above. 
  Equilibrium term deposits are derived by substituting in the F.O.C.’s for 
the respective equilibrium values of  M r  and  O r , and ELS is found by 
computing net liquidity exposures times the probability that they realize. 
 
Corollary 3.2.1.  It is easy to show that after a “within” merger, the loan rate of both the 
merged entity and the bank remaining outside the merger increase. Also 
term deposits increase. Whereas in the other region, everything remains 
as in the Status Quo. As a result, the price level increases while the 
expected liquidity shortages decrease. Hence a “within” merger imposes 
a trade-off upon policy in that the economy looses from a competition 
policy viewpoint, but wins from a prudential regulatory viewpoint. 
 





t + >   (13) 
 
Corollary 3.2.3.  It is easy to show that the post merger profits of the merged entity exceed 
both those of the outsider and the Status Quo, implying that if banks get 
the opportunity to merge, they will do so. 
 
3.b.3. Interregional mergers or mergers “Between” 
When a bank from the Northern Region, say N, merges with a bank from the Southern 
Region, say S, nothing changes immediately for any of the rivals. For the merging parties, 
only the cost side is affected for revenues are simply twice of what was obtained in the 
Status Quo. The profit function for the merged entity reads (instead of M we use m to 
indicate the values for the “between” merger). 
2


























c r   (14) 
whereas  i P  is given by (4). 
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It then is easy to show: 
 
Proposition 3.3.  After an interregional merger, the merged entity charges a loan rate given 
by 
5
~ 7 5 5 r c t
rm
+ +









1 - + =  . The 
banks remaining outside the merger charge 
5
~ 9 5 5 r c t
ro
+ +
=  and keep 









1 - - = . Equilibrium profits to the 














+ + + = P  . ELS is found again by 













Proof:  By differentiating equations (14) and (4), and substituting for the 
equilibrium expressions for term deposits that are obtained from the 
second set of F.O.C.’s into the first set of F.O.C.’s. Note however that 
banks remaining outside the merger will be facing rates charged by a 
merged entity at one side of their location, while they will face rates by 
another outsider on the other side of their location. Therefore, solving the 
appropriate system of reaction functions, one obtains the results for the 
loan rates. Equilibrium term deposits follow from substituting the loan 
rates in the second F.O.C.’s. Further substitution into ELS yields the 
desired results. 
 
Corollary 3.3.1.  It is easy to show that after a “between” merger has taken place, the loan 
rates of both the merged entity and outsiders decrease. But at the same 
time the term deposit holdings decrease. As a result, the price level 
decreases but expected liquidity shortages become more pronounced. 
Hence also a “between” merger imposes a trade-off upon policy in that 
the economy wins in terms of competitiveness but losses in terms of 
stability. 
   24 
Corollary 3.3.2.  It is easy to show that the post merger profits of the merged entity exceed 
again both these of the outsider and the Status Quo, again implying that if 
banks get the opportunity to engage in a “between” merger, they will. 
 
3.b.4. Interregional mergers with operational cost efficiencies 
In this subsection, we reconsider “within” mergers but now take into account that they may 
trigger cost savings. Suppose when N and SE merge, they can reduce the operational cost 
to 0. Not only will the merged entity now possess more market power, loans when they 
realize will be produced in a cheaper way compared to the situation for the remaining 


































r   (15) 
and 
 
i SW OUTSIDER P = P = P  as given by equation (4), after substituting  M r for  i r . 
 
The following proposition then can be shown: 
 
Proposition 3.4.  After an intraregional merger with operational cost savings, the merged 
entity charges a loan rate equal to 
3
~ 6 5 r c t
rM
+ +
=  and holds term 






 . The bank remaining outside the merger 
charges 
3
~ 6 2 4 r c t
ro
+ +





-  . 
Banks in the Southern Region charge rates and hold term deposits given 

































Proof:  Along the same lines as the proof of proposition 3.2. 
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Corollary 3.4.1.  After a “within” merger with operational cost reductions, it will depend 
on the magnitude of the cost reduction whether or not post merger 
equilibrium prices increase or decrease. If t < c, or bank credit lines are 
not too differentiated products, the post merger equilibrium is 
characterised by a decrease in loan rates and an increase in term deposits. 
Hence the economy wins both from a competition and stability angle. 
 
Corollary 3.4.2.  Post merger profits of the merged entity are clearly higher than both the 
profits of the outsider and profits before merger, so the incentives to 
engage in a within merger with cost reductions are present. 
 
3.b.5. Giga mergers 
Until now, only mergers involving two parties have been considered. Somehow, 
“universal” banks have been the result of consolidation within certain boundaries going 
hand in hand with concentration  across these boundaries. The resulting entities are 
characterised both by “scale” economies, implying substantial sales volumes within 
regions, and scope economies, implying an “omnipresence” of activities. In this  sub-
section, we investigate the implication of the creation of such a large bank. More in 
particular, we investigate a merger of N, SE, S and NW. Only SW and NE then remain as 
independent competitors. The profit function for the giga-bank becomes: 
 
  ( )
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c r   (16) 
 
While profits to SW and NE are again given by equation (4), susbtitutiong appropriately 
for  G r . 
 
The following proposition then can be shown: 
 
Proposition 3.5.  After a giga merger, the “large” bank changes 
3
~ 4 3 5 r c t
rG
+ +
=  and 






= . The outsider banks SW and NE charge 
loan rates 
3
~ 5 3 4 r c t + +











- - = . Profits to the   26 
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Proof:  A combination of the approach used to prove resp. propositions 3.2. and 
3.3. can be applied in a straight forward way. 
 
Corollary 3.5.1.  “Giga” mergers may increase or decrease post merger loan rates. “Giga” 
mergers may increase or decrease ELS. 
 
Corollary 3.5.2.  A “giga” merger increases the profits for the merged entity both w.r.t. the 
Status Quo and post merge outsider profits. 
 
Corollary 3.5.1.  deserves some comments. Although mergers which only involve two 
parties, such as the “between” and “within” mergers considered above, introduced policy 
trade-offs for sure, this may not be the case for a larger operation. In order to illustrate this, 
consider the case where  r r t 7 / 4 ~ = = . It is easy to show that vis-à-vis the Status Quo, 
neither the loan rate charged by the “giga” merger nor ELS will change. Also the rates 
charged by the outsiders will be equal to those charged in the Status Quo, and hence the 
antitrust authority will clear the operation. So as far as loan rates and ELS economy-wide 
is considered, the post-merger outcome coincides with the Status Quo. 
 
Intuitively, this can be explained by the important cost savings that compensate for the 
increase in market power. A “giga” merger involves the same market power as a within 
merger (except for 2 regions now being affected), but this increase in market power easily 
can be offset by the important cost savings due to improved liquidity management 
possibilities who pertain to much larger entities (2 banks in the North can now benefit from 
the excess liquidity in the South). 
 
This certainly is a remarkable finding, indicating that merger operations double in size than 
others should be cleared, as compared to the latter. In order to show this in more detail, we 
next turn to an inventory of the mergers that would be cleared, given that the review 
process is structured in a particular way. 
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3.c. The model: policy implications 
 
Four merger types have been reviewed. For the two most typical cases, i.e. the “within” 
and “between” merger, it was indicated that a policy trade-off inevitably is present. For the 
other two cases, i.e. the  “within” merger with cost decreases and the  “giga” merger, 
everything depends on the values the parameters take. 
 
The organisation of the merger review process therefore is critical in order to determine 
which mergers will get approved. Regarding the practical organisation of this process, 
Carletti and Hartmann (2002a) show that there exists a wide divergence among the 
different countries they screened. A priori, a good starting point to investigate the 
organisation of a review process where different decision makers are involved i s the 
framework introduced by Sah and Stiglitz (1986). The distinction made there is between an 
organisation in which agents can get their project approved when they are cleared by two 
(all) supervisors, versus one in which it is sufficient to obtain clearance by any single 
supervisor. The first case is defined to be a hierarchy, which is to be seen here in the sense 
of introducing projects with the lower supervisor, and then, if he agrees to put the project 
on the desk of a higher authority, to get it approved there. In a polyarchy on the contrary it 
is sufficient to obtain the approval of any supervisor. 
 
Needless to say that, given the trade-offs that have been documented in the previous 
section, a polyarchy is not a very useful organisation of the merger review process to 
consider analyzing in detail since it will clear any operation that is proposed. Therefore, it 
seems much more interesting to introduce a one stop shop principle, indicating that either 
competition policy or prudential regulation dictates whether or not an operation is cleared. 
And then to contrast this organisation of the merger review process to a hierarchy where 
both authorities have to agree. In doing so, we refer to the solution where bank mergers are 
exempted from the general competition law and placed under the responsibility of the 
prudential regulation as the “Exemption” approach. Whereas for these countries in which 
bank mergers resort under the general competition law, we use the terminology “General 
Rule”. Table 2 then summarizes the findings of the previous section by indicating whether 
or not, or depending or which conditions, a particular merger will be accepted given a 
specific organisation of the merger review process.   28 
Table 2:  Merger Review Organisation and Merger Type: 
  Which organisation clears which merger 
 
























Clear if t < c 
 
GIGA 
Clear if  r t ~ <  and if 
condition A is 
satisfied 
Clear if condition A 
is satisfied 
 
Clear if  r t ~ <  
 
Condition  r r t r t r A ~ 2 10 ~ 21 : + >  
 
In order to use the insights of the table above to explain why particular countries have 
chosen for a particular organisation of the merger review process, it is clear that particular 
parameter values play a crucial role. Under the  “general  rule”, countries will clear 
“between” (revenue enhancing mergers) as well us a number of other operations provided 
that bank credit lines are not too heterogonous products. Where countries exempt the 
merger review process from the general competition rule, it is clear that they favour 
“domestic” consolidation. As a matter of fact, they impose tougher standards on a “giga” 
merger than on a “within” merger, although from the perspective of the borrowing firms, 
the relevant market structure is pretty much the same. 
 
 




The present model is a fairly simple one and hence still many extensions are conceivable. 
Besides changing particular assumptions, the more interesting extensions undoubtedly will 
come from keeping the model in its current set up but taking it to catch different market 
structures as well as different assumptions regarding the origin and impact of the liquidity 
shock. We start with discussing the latter and then move into considering two changes to 
the market structure. A final extension involves charging the policy environment. 
 
 
4.a. Origins and implications of liquidity shocks 
 
The present model has liquidity demand originating from commitments that realize on the 
asset side of the balance sheet. In the classical taste for liquidity à la Bryant-Diamond-
Dybvig, the preference for liquidity is due to impatient depositors. The transformation of 
the duration of the different claims puts the bank in a vulnerable position. When the bad 
equilibrium of a coordination game between depositors realizes, a bank run pushes the 
financial intermediary into insolvency. 
 
The maintained assumption in this paper, viz. the idea that sources of market power and 
cost efficiency gains cannot be separated from liquidity issues, can nicely be introduced in 
the classical model with a taste for liquidity by depositors. This could be done along the 
lines set out by Temzelides (1996), who investigates the impact of local interaction on 
bank panics in a repeated version of the Diamond-Dybvig model. His findings, that bank 
runs spread first among banks in the same geographic location before moving throughout 
the entire population clearly could be used to restate the maintained assumption in a 
different setting. 
 
A competing theory of bank runs is due to Gorton (1985) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991). 
Here, bank runs are the  result of asymmetric information between depositors and the 
financial services industry. While the latter know that some players, i.e. banks became 
insolvent due to real shocks (firms are unable to pay back their loans), depositors don’t 
know which banks are affected. Since insolvent banks abscond with the remainings of their 
assets, depositors withdraw their holdings form all banks. Recent empirical studies, see 
e.g. Carlson (2002) or Dwyer and Hafer (2001) try to disentangle the real world shocks 
with asymmetric explanation from the “impatient preferences” model. This approach to   30 
liquidity shocks however can be incorporated also in a very easy and logical way. If it is 
assumed that the public knows that some firm in a particular sector or region failed, but it 
is unclear which firm precisely, or for the matter which particular bank firm relationship 
exists, they will run on all banks in the same region or sector. (“They could be all in it”). 
 
In order to incorporate this origin of banking panics into the present model, the profit 
functions have to be adjusted in order to incorporate the possibility that loans are not paid 
back. Rather than focussing on credit line competition, the model then investigates 
competition for loans with depositors who are afraid that the loan portfolio might turn bad 
and that they then hold claims on an insolvent bank. When moving from the Status Quo to 
an analysis of particular merger types, two additional changes need to be made. First, 
larger entities, i.e. merged banks might be bailed out. If this is the case, a merger has the 
additional competitive advantage that runs can be avoided, at the expense of increasing 
moral hazard problems of course. 
 
Second, when interregional mergers take place, a run on the banks in the North could also 
trigger a run on a particular bank in the South, namely the one engaged in a merger with a 
bank in the North. So if depositors are aware of the pattern of mergers that took place, they 
will withdraw their depositors from a bank in the South, for they know this bank is merged 
with a bank in the North that could be insolvent. Since it is rational to run on every bank in 
the North, it is equally rational to run on the South branch of the merged entity. 
 
This last consideration mitigates the incentives to merge in the sense that an interregional 
merger might not lead to the desired liquidity management improvements. Whether or not 
this is the case will depend among other things on the information that depositors have 
regarding the mergers that took place between banks in different regions and whether or 
not a bailout policy is in place. 
 
In any event, liquidity shocks of a different origin certainly offer perspectives for further 
researching the maintained hypothesis, along the lines just described. The practical 
development and analysis of the models is deferred to future research. 
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4.b. Market structure: LOLR-behavior 
 
Another extension that is important to consider involves the explicit role that could be 
played by the LOLR. In the analysis of the previous section, the LOLR takes the surplus 
liquidity in the depressed region, at 0 cost, exploiting its monopsony power, to provide the 
additional funds needed in the other region. The price of these funds is an upward sloping 
function of the volume of funds needed. It could be interesting to endogenize this function, 
for example by deriving it from the optional control problem that a Central Bank solves 
when it controls inflation, eventually together with an output goal. 
 
In any event, the revenues that are collected from providing funds to the banks in the 
booming region should enter this objective function as a profit. At the same time, to the 
extent that additional funds are needed on top of the liquidity generated in the other region, 
money creation is needed. This then will trigger inflation which enters the objective 
function with a penalty factor. 
 
Instead of extending the role of the LOLR to solving an optimal control problem, a simpler 
exercise then can be made. When focussing on merger implications, a linear function for 
the costs of additional funds obtained from the LOLR has been used, viz.  ( ) y r y r . =  . 
When the LOLR has to determine the value of the parameter r , what would it pick? And 
how does this choice affect the direction that is given to the M&A market? 
 
In order to analyze these questions, notice that the objective function of the LOLR should 
include the profits made on providing additional funds minus a penalty for the money that 
is created in this process. For the moment, we assume that the LOLR takes the Status Quo 
as given, and does not take into account the direction given to the M&A market. Hence a 
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=   (19) 
By comparing the post merger equilibrium profits of both a “between” and “within” 
merger, it then equally becomes possible to endogenize the merger type that will emerge. 
More in particular, only the profits of the “within” merger depended on  r , which now can 
be expressed in r ~ . Therefore, it is easy to show that a “within” merger will be preferred to 
a “between” merger when  ( )
r
t
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It then becomes possible to state: 
 
Proposition 4.1.  When the LOLR chooses r  so as to maximise an objective function that 
takes into account both the revenues from the LOLR activity and an 
inflation target, while  r ~  is distributed uniformely over the unit interval 
and t is distributed uniformely over the interval [0, 1.89], the market will 
propose 49,44% of “within” mergers against 50,55% of “between” 
mergers. 
 
Proof:  When equation (20) is written as an equality, it traces a curve in the 
( ) r t ~ , -space. All points which lie above this curve represent realizations 
of  r ~  and  t which favour “within” mergers over “between” mergers, 
whereas the opposite holds for points below the curve. Since the 
distributional assumptions make every point equally probable, the area 
under the curve can be used to represent the share of “between” mergers. 
Integrating equation (20) as an equality over the unit interval yields an 
area equal to .96 whereas the total area equals 1.89. This yields the 
percentages mentioned. 
 
Corollary 4.1.1.  Few if any direction to the M&A market is given by an LOLR who 
chooses  r  in the way just described. When a simple markup rule 
r r ~ 25 . 1 =  would be followed, the outcome would be nearly the same, 
since it is easily verified that the share of “within” mergers would be 
49,99%. 
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When the LOLR determines r  as a Stackelberg leader before mergers realize, the situation 
becomes a different one. Since “between” mergers both bring increased revenues and more 
liquidity creation, while “within” mergers do the opposite, the LOLR has to balance the 
costs and benefits of each scenario, taking into account the probability that they realize. 
This is a complex problem which is left for future research. 
 
 
4.c. Market structure: increased contagion possibilities 
 
One market structure that is also different from the present and that merits investigation is 
the “incomplete market structure”, see Allen and Gale (2000), p. 13, as opposed to the 
“disconnected” version studied in the previous section. In order to investigate mergers in 
this new setting, the two regions must be brought together into one region which can be 
represented by a circle of length 6, on which 6 banks are spaced with equal distance among 
them. The liquidity shock again affects several banks, but rather than affecting always the 
same cluster of 3 banks, the shock “moves” along the circle, each time having a different 
starting point, and extending 180 degrees in clockwise sense. As such, each bank can be in 
a cluster with every other bank. Figure 4 illustrates this market structure. 
 
Figure 4: An Incomplete Market Structure 








   34 
While the analysis is more involved and the results extend beyond the scope of the present 
paper, similar trade-offs to those documented in the previous section show up in the 
analysis. Especially when the liquidity shock does not extend over an arc of 120 degrees, 
opposite banks know that when they merge, they never will be affected by the same 
liquidity shock. Again mergers out of different motives then must be considered. Mergers 
with nearby banks again create market power, but the probability of being hit by the same 
liquidity shock is present. On the other hand, a merger with a remote bank, as in the model 
of section 3 above, allows for an improved scope in managing long term funding. As such, 




4.d. Regions as Nations 
 
A final series of extensions could involve the re-interpretation of regions as nations, each 
having the same or a different policy mix. Now the appropriate organisation of decision 
making should be the Sah-Stiglitz hierarchy since in order to obtain clearance, the merger 
has to be approved by the relevant authority in each country. This will lead to clearcut 
differences in outcomes as compared to the outcome where both authorities operated on 
the some jurisdiction. 
 
To show this, it is important to notice that at least 3 different organisations of the merger 
review process need to be looked at when 2 countries are involved. In fact, these are: 
-  Both countries have bank mergers following the general competition rule. 
-  Both countries exempt merger review from the competition law and let the prudential 
regulator decide. 
-  One country follows the general competition law while the other exempts. Without loss 
of generality, we assume that the Northern country follows the general rule while the 
South exempts. 
 
Regarding the different merger operations that can be screened, we now have to distinguish 
between “within” mergers according to the country in which the consolidation takes place. 
As such, we will consider “within N” and “within S” mergers, next to the “between” and 
“giga” operations. 
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When the general rule applies to both countries, it is clear that none of the “within” 
mergers will pass. “Between” mergers will be cleared while for “giga” mergers, it will 
depend on whether  r t ~ < . When both countries on the other hand exempt bank mergers 
from the monitoring of competition authorities, the “between” merger will be blocked 
while the “within” operations will pass. The “giga” merger will be cleared when “condition 
A” holds, see above. 
 
Finally, consider settings where a different policy mix prevails between the two countries. 
If for example the Northern Country focuses on competition policy, while the Southern 
Country on stability issues, only within border mergers in the South will be cleared. To see 
why this is the case, consider a “within” merger in the North. It will be blocked by the 
antitrust authority. Next consider a “between”, or in this case a cross-border merger. The 
prudential regulator in the South will oppose to it. Hence by elimination only the “within” 
merger in the Southern Country will realize. When “within” mergers are characterized by 
sufficient gains in operational costs, now also the Northern Country will start approving 
these operations. “Between” mergers remain blocked by the prudential regulator in the 
Southern Country. Finally, the “giga” merger will only clear when both condition A and 
r t ~ <  hold, as if policy was organised as a hierarchy within one and the same country, i.e. 
the setting considered in the previous section. Table 3 below summarizes most of these 
findings. It also includes still another case, namely a “between” type of merger, but the 
operation taking place between countries who are differentially  affected by liquidity 
demand. We first explain i ntuitively why a separate analysis has to be done for this 
particular case. Then we state our findings in the format of a proposition. 
 
When countries are differentially affected by liquidity demand, “within” merger operations 
don’t change the policy outcomes since all consequences of these operations remain within 
the countries’ boundaries. Therefore, all entries for the two first rows of table 3 remain the 
same. When “between” or “giga” mergers taken place however, banks who in the Status 
Quo operated in a country with a low probability of facing the need of getting additional 
funding, now will operate in a country with a higher probability of a liquidity shortage. 
Although the terminology is not appropriate to the present context, one could describe it as 
one where a particular bank, involved in a “between” operation, leaves to some extent the 
“safe” territory of the home market to compete in a foreign, more “dangerous” 
environment. Clearly the terminology is not adequate for there are no “safe” and 
“dangerous” countries in the present model, only countries characterised by a higher 
probability of facing liquidity shortages. In addition, we know that banks take more   36 
precautions by attracting term deposits when an increased probability of facing additional 
liquidity needs prevails. 
 
Nonetheless, the underlying idea of “contamination” of one country by another as the 
result of a “between” merger is worthwhile to pursue. Therefore, we will analyse the 
outcome of a “between” merger when  2 / 1 > q , i.e. the Northern country has more change 
to face an uprise in economic activity. Since we assumed that the Northern country also is 
the one which sticks to the general rule, we have the following situation. The Southern 
country which is worried for stability, and therefore has exempted the bank merger review 
process from the general competition policy rule now faces a merger between one of the 
banks it monitors, and a bank that operates in another country where the probability of 
needing liquidity is more pronounced. 
 
Before stating the outcome of such a “between” merger, it is necessary to note a few 
changes, both regarding the policy target and the objective functions of the players. More 
in particular, the definition of Expected Liquidity Shortages changes when an environment 
of regions is abandoned to analyse a world of countries. There now are 2 LOLR’s, and 
more important, the liquidity which is not needed in the country which remains depressed 
cannot be used to fund the increased economic activity in the other country. 
 
At the same time, antitrust authorities will investigate whether or not a merger operation 
increases the price level in the particular country that they monitor. And more important, 
the Status Quo will be characterised by different loan rates across countries. The Status 
Quo values for the loan rates charged and deposits in the Northern resp. Southern country 
are given by proposition 3.1, while the objective function for then merged entity reads: 
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The objective functions of the other players both in the Southern and Northern countries 
again can be found by making the appropriate substitutions in equation (4). 
 
It then becomes possible to state. 
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Proposition 4.2:  After an interregional merger between banks operating in different 
countries, moreover characterised by different probabilities of needing 
additional funds, the merged entity changes a loan rate equal to 
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Proof:  Following the same algorithm used in proving the previous propositions, 
taking into account the appropriate definitions of ELS. 
 
Corollary 4.2.1.  Consider the case  7 / 5 2 / 1 < <q . Then  u N
SQ r r r > >  and hence the 
antitrust authority which needs to clear the merger in the Northern 
country approves. If at the same time,  t r
5
4
< , it will be the case that 
SQ
S S ELS ELS <  and therefore the merger will also be approved by the 
Southern country where the prudential regulator welcomes the decreased 
expected shortage in liquidity. Therefore, the merger will also be cleared 
in both countries when S exempts and N follows the general rule. 
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Corollary 4.2.2.  Neither the antitrust authority in the Northern Country nor the antitrust 
authority in the Southern Country will block the merger when 
7
5
< q . It is 





S S r r < . By assumption, 
2 / 1 > q  and hence this condition is satisfied. We also know that 
7
5
< q  
guarantees 
SQ
N N r r <  and hence the merger will be approved everywhere 
when both countries follow the general rule. 
 
Finally, we can state: 
 
Corollary 4.2.3.  It is easy to prove that 
SQ
N N ELS ELS <  always holds. Corollary 4.2.1. 
states 
SQ
S S ELS ELS <  holds under particular conditions. Hence if these 
conditions are satisfied, the merger will be cleared by both countries 
when they exempt the merger review process from the general rule. 
 
The results stated in corollaries 4.2.1., 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. are included in the last row of table 
3, which also summarizes previous findings.  
 
Comparing the outcome of the merger review process when countries rather than regions 
are the relevant entities in which the different banks operate reveals some interesting and 
novel elements. When the review process is exempted form the general rule, either in one 
country with 2 regions or in both countries of the economy, outcomes are the same. In each 
case, “within” mergers are cleared and “between” mergers are blocked. “Giga” mergers are 
cleared under the same conditions. The same conclusion goes when either the general rule 
prevails in one country with two regions or when each country chooses to follow this 
policy line. 
 
Differences however emerge when countries follow a different policy rule. This situation 
can best be compared to the hierarchical organisation of merger review when two regions 
within a country are involved. Indeed, given the sovereignty of states, “between” mergers 
will only be cleared when both countries approve, while “within” mergers need to be 
cleared only by the authorities of the country in which they take place. Clearly then if one 
country chooses to exempt the merger review process from the general competition rule, 
this opens the possibility to clear “within” operations. In addition, some “between” 
mergers will be cleared if liquidity needs are asymmetric. This might come as a surprise 
given the possibility that with differences in liquidity needs, the country which faces   39 
relatively less liquidity shocks might fear “contamination”. Yet, when the shocks are not 
too asymmetric and additional funding with LOLR is not too expensive, a  “between” 
merger will get cleared. 
 
When bank mergers are involved, countries when designing antitrust policies certainly take 
into account the possibility of cross-border mergers, see Van Cayseele and Smets (1995). 
And accordingly they will pick the policy regime which favours their preferred outcome. 
As before, when preferences are against cross-border consolidation and both countries 
exempt the merger review process from the general competition rule, concentration will 
take place mostly on the domestic market, increasing loan rates. When the country who 
faces most of the time a liquidity shortage however chooses to stick with the general 
competition rule, cross-border consolidation stands a chance. Undoubtedly, these issues 
need further exploration as globalisation only will  force the financial services industry 
more and more into cross-border activities, if only to follow their clients. 
 
Table 3:  Merger Review Organisation (Column) and Merger Type (Row): 
  Which  Organisation  Clears which  Merger when different Countries are 
Involved? 
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How should a country structure the merger review process when the merging firms are 
banks? In reality, a variety of answers have been given to this question since different 
organisational settings co-exist. The present paper argues that this is the result of mergers 
not being alike, and hence having different implications for allocative efficiency and 
stability. 
 
In order to show this, a simple model of localized banking competition was analyzed. 
Given that the same factors that lead to market power after a merger imply that the merged 
entity is more affected by liquidity needs, mergers for different motivations will exist. 
More in particular, there will be mergers that do not aim at the creation of market power 
but instead try to improve  upon liquidity management by using funding obtained in one 
region to  cover up for liquidity demand originating in another region. 
 
In contrast, mergers out of market power motives raise interest rates, but reduce the 
expected liquidity demand on the LOLR or the central bank. Or they yield opposite effects 
as compared to mergers out of funding efficiency reasons, which raise the expected 
liquidity demand on the system, but reduce interest rates. 
 
Given these policy trade-offs, there is no straightforward way to organise the merger 
review process. If for example one requires that merger operations are cleared by both the 
antitrust authority and the prudential regulator, none of the simple merger types will pass 
the review process. But this implies that potentially large gains, for example in growth due 
to reduced interest rates, are foregone. If on the other hand one allows that mergers take 
place if clearance is obtained by either the antitrust authority or the prudential regulator, 
intraregional mergers will present their case for the prudential regulatory and obtain 
approval, while interregional merger will appeal to the antitrust regulator, and also obtain 
approval. But this implies that potentially large costs are inflicted upon the economy. 
Hence, the optimal solution to organise merger review in the banking industry is unlikely 
to be either a Sah-Stiglitz hierarchy, or polyarchy. Instead, a one stop shop principle, where 
one authority reviews the merger and decides, then is more appropriate. 
 
This is precisely what one observes  most of the time  in reality, where a variety of 
organizational schemes seem to co-exist. Of course, the particular choice of the one 
authority that then is in charge for clearing the operation will reflect the relative weight put   41 
on the preference for allocative efficiency versus stability in the welfare objective of the 
country. A first conclusion that follows from the analysis therefore reads: 
 
1°  When bank mergers are exempted from the general competition rule and placed 
under the supervision of the prudential regulator, mergers between regions or 
sectors will tend to be blocked. Implicitly therefore, countries who have chosen to 
exempt bank merger review from the general competition law reveal some preference 
for consolidation taking place within the boundaries of the regions or sectors in which 
the banks are active. When taken to an international setting, countries who have 
chosen for exemption  induce domestic consolidation, disfavouring cross-border 
consolidation. 
 
Besides exposing the presence of these policy trade-offs, the maintained assumption also 
reveals other, often less expected results. A second conclusion that follows from the 
analysis indeed is: 
 
2°  The detrimental effects of bank merger are not necessarily linear in merger size. 
Or a larger operation can be better than a smaller one. In the present model, this occurs 
because a giga merger (which takes together two within mergers in a between 
operation), can combine the advantage of the more outspoken precautionary 
provisions of the within operation with the cost efficiencies of the between merger. Of 
course, it is equally conceivable that a giga merger combines the disadvantages of 
“between” and “within” mergers, and as a matter of fact, for some parameter values 
this actually is the case. It remains nonetheless true that judging by mere inspection of 
the size of the operation, where larger is put equal to worse, is likely to lead to serious 
mistakes. 
 
The initial model is a fairly simple one, and therefore a few extension were made. These 
also yielded conclusions, although sometimes much more preliminary. As such, it became 
clear that: 
 
3°  Many other economic environments offer arguments  in favour of keeping the 
maintained assumption as the appropriate one. That is the same sources that lead to 
market power also will bring a positive correlation of liquidity needs. This also will be 
the case when the “disconnected” market structure is left for the “connected but 
incomplete” market structure. 
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Extending the analysis by modelling the interbank market is extremely important to shed 
further light on the optimal organization of the bank merger review process. A temptative 
endaveour in that direction was taken by endogenising LOLR-behaviour. It turns out that: 
 
4°  One of the most “neutral” (in the sense of not offering incentives to strongly favour 
stability enhancing mergers over mergers that improve on allocative efficiency, or vice 
versa)  approaches  an LOLR can take is when the objective function used to 
determine the refinancing rate in the sum of revenues minus a penalty for 
inflation created. When the LOLR takes into account the possibility to direct the bank 
merger process, and targets for instance a similar objective function, but after mergers 
have taken place, this might change. 
 
Finally, when countries decide on the way they want to organize the merger review process 
for banks, they certainly will take into account that “cross-border” mergers will emerge. 
Cross-border mergers are much like the “between” merger operations that capture the 
revenue enhancing motive for merger activity. Hence a re-interpretation of the policy 
conclusions seemed indicated. But since countries are sovereign nations, the merger needs 
to be cleared twice, or a Sah-Stiglitz hierarchy now is the inevitable structure for the 
merger review process. It then turns out that: 
 
5°  The conclusions regarding the mergers that will get approved or blocked are 
robust to the re-interpretation of regions as nations, provided that countries have 
the same preferences, i.e. they both exempt merger review from the general rule, 
or don’t exempt.  When countries however have different preferences regarding 
allocative efficiency and stability, some “within” and “between” mergers that would 
be clocked if they were reviewed by authorities operating in a hierarchical fashion 
within a single country now will be cleared. This will be the case for intraregional 
mergers in a country that has exempted merger review for the general competition 
rule. This will also be the case for interregional mergers in environments where 
countries are asymmetric regarding expected liquidity shortages. 
 
Undoubtedly, the model presented in this paper only offers an i nitial framework for 
analyzing the impact of bank mergers. The inclination therefore is towards methodology 
and less optimism  should prevail when simple policy prescriptions are expected when 
further extensions will be considered. The reason is that the present model sometimes is 
already involved and yet does not include:   43 
-  the mitigation of moral hazard/adverse selection problems as the result of merger 
activity; 
-  the possibilities of contagion through an interbank market; 
-  the possibly changed dynamic competition strategies regarding bank relationships after 
mergers; 
-  as well as other issues. 
 
The appropriate overall  conclusion therefore seems that the many different causes that 
could lead to instability of the banking system all deserve further investigation, for 
otherwise it will be hard to understand precisely what drives the mixed evidence regarding 
the relationship between concentration and stability of the financial system that is observed 
in reality, see Beck e.a. (2003). 
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